statistical techniques that scholars began to demonstrate that peace had in fact broken out in the midst of the cold war. Conventional scholarly wisdom was being overturned, even as "people power" toppled the Iron Curtain and overturned autocrats around the world. Though no less warlike than other states in general, democracies appeared less prone to fight each other. Researchers naturally assumed that democracy caused this special peace. Faith in the democratic peace was based on induction and the normative appeal of the "lawlike" observation, even while the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship lagged behind. As one observer quipped "We know it works in practice. Now we have to see if it works in theory!" (Lipson 2005:1) .
Making the democratic peace work in theory has proven surprisingly difficult. Problems in the fabrication of a canonical explanation for democratic peace may simply reflect the inherent complexity of the contingent observation. Accounting for peace using democracy requires that polities modify their foreign policies in response to regime characteristics of particular opponents. Most connections between foreign policy and international relations had been abandoned on the advice of realists like Kenneth Waltz. Though domestic political origins of international relations are now being explored with renewed vigor, it will take time before researchers have made up for generations of inattention. It is also possible that problems encountered in shoehorning democracy into the democratic peace indicate the need for critical inquiry. There are other plausible causes of peace among prosperous, liberal societies that until recently had received little scholarly attention.
The liberal tradition actually consists of two schools of thought on the causes of peace, one emphasizing representative government and international deliberative bodies and the other advocating global markets and economic development. Research on the democratic peace has chosen to pursue the liberal political school, with a particular focus on Kant's Perpetual Peace. Attention to regime type is certainly not unreasonable, but much of the available scholarship can be faulted for ignoring or largely discounting the contributions of liberal political economy.
1 Montesquieu, Bastiat, Cobden, Angell, and others offered insights that were considered comparable to Kant at the dawn of the last century. While both schools fell out of favor in the wake of two world wars, only Kant has received significant scholarly attention, and an intellectual makeover, in recent years.
An increasing number of contemporary scholars are beginning to return to the idea that markets hold the potential for interstate cooperation. Still, many questions remain, even as skepticism about the capitalist peace persists. We use the Interstate Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset to evaluate new hypotheses about the effects of democracy and capitalism on crisis intensity and escalation. Critical comparisons are essential in refining our understanding of the liberal peace. We also replicate work by Gartzke (2007) , making a few corrections to this study and demonstrating consistent results.
Our analysis builds on a vision of peace involving free markets and economic development. First, development has contrasting consequences for interstate conflict. Technological innovation and industrialization vastly increase the ability of some countries to project power, while modern production systems eventually make it cheaper to purchase, rather than coerce, land and the resources that exist in and on territory. In contrast, the extension of economic and other interests beyond national borders increases incentives to "police" relevant regions and exercise influence, sometimes through force. Second, since advanced industrial nations do not fundamentally disagree on critical aspects of the international system, most fighting now occurs among developing countries or between developed and developing states (Gartzke 2006; Gartzke and Rohner 2009) . Third, global financial networks serve as a test of the credibility of leaders' claims and discourage bluffing (Gartzke and Li 2003) . Mechanisms that facilitate the transmission of credible information across international boundaries limit bargaining failure, enhancing interstate peace (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998 Schultz , 2001 ).
We find considerable support for this modernized conception of the capitalist peace. Nations that are financially open to the global economy, and that face constrained or interdependent monetary policies, experience fewer interstate crises. Development appears to discourage contiguous states from fighting over territory, while increasing policy-based crises. Policy affinity leads to fewer ICB crises. Democracy, in contrast, appears to have no significant impact on interstate crisis behavior. Results are also consistent with our expectations for crisis intensity and escalation.
LITERATURE: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION
Evidence is the most important disciplining factor in science. Without it, inquiry risks becoming a philosophical exercise, expressing the (hopefully finite) possibilities that could obtain given a particular set of circumstances. At the same time, reason is necessary for any compelling causal account. If the democratic peace agenda can be faulted, it is probably because research has relied too heavily on evidence, and too little on theory. Explanations of dubious deductive coherence could be advanced because their predictions were validated, often by empirical relationships that were already known or were similar to existing evidence. Explanations for the capitalist peace seem to be mimicking the evolution of democratic peace theories. This is not surprising, since both sets of liberal arguments occupy the same, or a very similar, empirical space. In both literatures, theories can be organized around the putative causal mechanism of peace: norms, institutions, or information. Insights gained from the democratic peace research agenda could prove helpful in honing deductive capitalist peace theories. Still, if researchers are to avoid the trap of inductive theorizing, we must come prepared with coherent explanations and more precise hypothetical expectations.
Democratic Peace
Back in the distant days when the quantitative research agenda on the democratic peace was getting its start, adherents debated whether democracies were more peaceful with each other because of "norms" or "institutions." Both arguments involved constraints on executive power. The claim was that authorities in democracies might be willing to fight, but that they were held in check by attributes of liberal domestic politics. Norms are soft constraints; democracies would not use force against one another because that was not the democratic way (Dixon 1993 (Dixon , 1994 . Citizens in a democracy are restrained from violence by (internal or external) modes of appropriateness (Risse-Kappen 1995 , 1996 . If democratic citizens were loath to use force because of an "ought," perhaps so too democracies were reluctant to fight out of a sense of justice or obligation, or out of fear that other states or groups would not see the nation's actions as just (Flynn and Farrell 1999) .
Institutions pose an analogous barrier to violence, though here the constraints are imposed by, in effect, a formalization of these same norms (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992) . This hard constraint, it is argued, ensures that democracies do not fight each other because force is not a sanctioned method of competition within the democratic political process. The same institutions that prevent violence within democracies-institutions that sponsor deliberation and debate as conflict resolution mechanisms-might well prevent democracies from pursuing politics through violence abroad, at least when confronted by other democracies (Ray 1995 (Ray , 1997 Russett 1993) .
For several reasons, this first generation of democratic peace theories has lost some of its luster. For one, it has turned out to be very difficult to differentiate the two explanations empirically (Maoz and Russett 1993; Huth and Allee 2002) . Others question the logic of constraint arguments (c.f., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999) . It was never exactly clear why institutions or norms that were so robust in resisting the impetus to war among democracies could so easily be brushed aside when the enemy was an autocracy. Certainly it might be necessary for a democracy to defend itself if suddenly attacked by an autocratic enemy, but democracies are often the initiators of conflict in heterogeneous dyads. Many contests in the post-World War II period pitted a capable democracy against a weak or distant autocratic power. Even in cases where the autocratic state is strong, the use of force by democracies is often deliberate, concerted, and aggressive. Norms and institutions explanations for the democratic peace have also fared poorly in the wake of U.S. actions in the "war on terror," where it appears that few, if any, constraints on the use of force were effective.
Perhaps the greatest logical challenge to constraint theories comes in the form of the security dilemma. Making force more costly, risky, or unappealing for one actor could certainly prevent that actor from preferring force, but it may have the opposite effect on other actors. Insights about strategic interaction emphasize that power or security is zero-sum. If one ties one's dog to a stake in the yard, one can be confident that the dog will not chase the neighbor's cat down the street, but one will also have to pay more attention to the possibility that the cat will now find its way into one's living room. Reducing the ability of an actor to act aggressively increases the appeal of aggression for an opponent. What the net effects of these changes might be is difficult to determine but in general, the more competitive the environment, the less constraints discourage aggression.
What if the constraint is mutual? If one state or actor is constrained, perhaps the security dilemma still applies, but bilateral barriers to conflict might seem to lend themselves to the dyadic democratic peace observation. Schelling (1966) addresses this issue in the parable of the mountain climbers. A pair of climbers tied together set out to scale a steep cliff face. Their fates are entwined by the rope that physically unites them. If one climber is in distress, the other can use the rope to come to the first climber's assistance. As such, the rope is a linkage with attributes of a public good. Some of the benefits or risks imposed by nature and a climber's own actions accrue to one's partner (externalities), while the costs of the ascent can be distributed through bargaining.
In contrast to democratic peace theorists, Schelling's objective was to find ways to allow nations to continue to compete in a world where many thought nuclear war had made conflict unthinkable. Neither climber (or nuclear power) could intentionally send the other to its death, since this was equivalent to suicide. Schelling used the climbers' predicament to illustrate how accident could be manipulated for gain. Nuclear weapons had made direct confrontation impossible. They had literally changed the game of international politics from prisoners' dilemma to chicken. This did not curtail conflict. Instead, what had changed was how actors competed in the shadow of annihilation. Figure 1 diagrams the situation addressed by Schelling and the constraint theorists. Both take a similar approach, while claiming contradictory outcomes. Imagine two countries (A and B) choosing between two strategies labeled Make or Take. Take is less efficient, involving some deadweight loss for both parties, so that [Make,Make] is the socially optimal outcome. The game and individual strategies are defined by players' rankings over outcomes. For example, if A and B both prefer Take to Make regardless of the other player's strategy, then this is a game of Prisoners' Dilemma.
Schelling solves his problem (an inability for players to compete) by recognizing that his nuclear protagonists can play Chicken rather than Prisoners' Dilemma. Neither actor wants to end up at [Take,Take] with certainty, but each is willing to play Take if the other plays Make, or vice versa. More to the point, each player has some willingness to risk the [Take,Take] outcome if this increases the chances that it will get to Take while its opponent chooses Make. Balancing risks and players' valuations for the stakes is central to bargaining and also introduces the question of uncertainty.
What was a solution for Schelling is actually a problem for constraint arguments. Though they want to get to Peace, making war mutually unacceptable (if indeed the costs of norms or institutions in deterring conflict are sufficiently grave) fails to preclude the two Chicken equilibria. Indeed, precisely because it imposes an upper bound on the intensity of contests, chicken tends to increase the frequency of conflict. A mutual understanding that large-scale war is unthinkable paradoxically makes it safer to consider lower intensity warfare. In the cold war, the two superpowers and their clients engaged in abundant peripheral clashes, proxy wars, and other forms of lesser aggression. Though World War III did not occur, it came close at times as the superpowers struggled to determine who was more resolved on the precipice of nuclear war. The real danger in these contests was thus uncertainty about what would resolve the conflict. Information, available from the "hot line" and satellite reconnaissance, may have helped as much or more than nuclear deterrence.
The U.S./Soviet dyad was among the most, if not the most, disputatious during the cold war. If the vast consequences of nuclear conflagration did not constrain the superpowers from numerous acts of conflict, what cost or constraint are capital or democracy likely to impose to impel peace? Whatever its putative cause, the liberal peace is more than a claim about the reluctant submission of aggressive nations to barriers to war. It is not as if democracies or capitalist countries are chomping at the bit to redress old grievances or to realize ongoing greed. Rather, these nations lack the impetus to war. The most prosperous, developed nations appear largely satisfied with the global status quo. They have few significant differences. They lack the motives for violence, not the ability to act aggressively against one another, should such motives arise. The peace we observe is thus much more about a compatibility of interests or preferences than it is about constraints.
CAPITALIST PEACE
While modest in comparison with the democratic peace research agenda, scholarship on the "capitalist peace" has expanded considerably in recent years. Capitalist peace research involves a range of arguments tied to liberal political economy. Whether as an alternative or complement, there is increasing attention to the role of markets in bringing about the diminution of interstate conflict.
Interestingly, the same set of theoretical frameworks that evolved in democratic peace research now asserts itself in the capitalist peace. Markets may bring about a transformation in accepted modes of interaction. Schumpeter (1955) calls on the culture of economic freedom to raise mankind from the carnage of world war. Similarly, Polanyi (1957) views the rise of market forces as the critical determinant of the political transformations apparent in modern societies. While not inspired by previous "economic norms" theorists, contemporary scholarship by Mousseau (2000 Mousseau ( , 2003 reflects the idea that capitalism alters relationships among individuals and between populations and the state in ways that have virtuous consequences for international peace. Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal (2003) find that peace is exclusive to developed democracies, while poorer liberal states fail to experience any reduction in conflict. The soft constraint of capitalist cultural norms of appropriate competition operates in a manner comparable to normative theories of democratic peace. A "contract rich society" impels leaders to refrain from violence that would harm these relationships (Mousseau 2009 ).
There are many institutionalist formulations of capitalist peace. Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Paine, Cobden, and Angell all saw market mechanisms as creating conditions that made war more costly, and therefore unacceptable. In recent times, Weede (2003 Weede ( , 2005 has explored the role of globalization in creating incentives for the participants in free markets to 122 E. Gartzke and J. J. Hewitt cooperate. McDonald (2009) , in particular, emphasizes the role of markets as domestic institutions. "The domestic institutional foundations of liberal economic systems promote peace between states" (McDonald 2009:15) . There are problems with the assumption that making war more costly or risky leads nations to peace, as we have already suggested. Capitalist institutions must prevent conflict, not just diminish the intensity of conflict that occurs, if in fact contests are to become less likely in an anarchical world. To see why this is so, let us turn next to our version of the capitalist peace.
INTERSTATE CONFLICT AND THE CAPITALIST PEACE
The determinants of political violence can be said to occur in two stages. Peace is more likely if the causes at either stage are interdicted or reduced. War results in this conception from a set of necessary conditions, while the absence of any one condition is sufficient for peace (Fearon 1995) .
The first stage of conflict involves motives for competition. National interests or objectives must differ sufficiently for countries even to consider fighting. Realists contend that state interests are essentially always in conflict (Waltz 1959; Claude 1962) , but this is both rigid and narrow. States vary both in the intensity of their valuation for material objectives (land, resources), and in the compatibility of their nonmaterial goals (policies, influence). Resource competition has declined among capitalist countries, but these states still use force to seek control of political agendas.
The allocation of resources is strongly zero-sum; states do not share common interests over "who gets what," but mutual incentives exist to avoid costly methods of dispute resolution (such as war). The value of disputed resources may also be insufficient to warrant fighting. Policies often exhibit public goods characteristics; states may (or may not) possess compatible goals over such issues global or regional political, economic, and social institutions, international conventions and norms, cross-border crime, smuggling, piracy or terrorism, as well as the behavior of third-party states. Policy conflict should thus vary as a function of the compatibility of interests (Gartzke 1998) .
Classical interpretations of a capitalist peace argue that development and global markets eventually eliminate resource competition as a motive for war. Where early modern technology shocks and productivity increases propelled nations to distant conquest, the maturation of these same factors later led in the opposite direction. Empire was eventually deemed archaic as it became clear that needed raw materials would continue to make their way to industrial centers through free markets, rather than through mercantilist autarkies. Capital-intensive military force structures needed for victory on modern battlefields are poorly suited to the labor-intensive activity of occupation. Developed countries capable of projecting power continue to use force to shape international behavior, but they no longer seek to acquire property. Developing countries covet territory, but they often lack the ability to realize their desires. Territorial conflict is relegated to "tween" states possessing effective militaries, but with economies that have yet to industrialize or diversify.
In contrast, the increasing importance of the global commons for developed countries means that conflict is more likely to arise over policy differences. The distribution of market surpluses, norms and conventions, environmental and humanitarian issues, and nontraditional security concerns such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation all involve influence rather than direct physical control over resources or territory. The same features that make modern armies poorly suited to the labor-and casualty-intensive activities of occupation and resource extraction make them ideal for punitive attacks. Force can be applied quickly, far from home, and with relatively little direct risk to the metropol. Indeed, the increased interdependence of developed countries necessitates more attempts to influence distant states (Keohane and Nye 1989) . Even as development expands opportunities to influence other countries' choice of regime type, foreign policies, and other issues, there is little worth fighting about among capitalist countries. A stable consensus within the developed world about major questions of international organization has relegated policy conflicts among the industrialized nations to secondary issues. The motives for conflict, which historically were concentrated among the powerful and their ambitious challengers, are today clustered among the poor, and between the poor and the rich. Peace has broken out among the prosperous precisely because developed states now lack the historic motives that, from time immemorial, fueled conflict, and sometimes war.
The second stage of conflict involves the methods by which differences are addressed and resources or prerogatives are allocated. Under anarchy, these methods are typically diplomacy and war. Diplomacy can preempt fighting, but the two mechanisms are not substitutes, since war is really designed to influence the content of diplomatic bargains, just as diplomacy is widely understood to occur in the shadow of anticipated or ongoing warfare. Even as states compete, they have common incentives to minimize the burden of fighting by seeking to agree on the likely consequences of a contest, should one occur. Bargains are often forged that preempt fighting, just as ongoing contests are eventually resolved through tacit or formal agreements (Hicks 1963; Fearon 1995) .
How might capitalism change states' preferences or better inform them about the preferences of others? A considerable literature suggests that trade and other economic activities deter conflict by making fighting expensive (Bliss and Russett 1998; Gasiorowski 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997; Polachek 1980 Polachek , 1997 Polachek, Robst and Chang 1999) . Still, it is difficult to imagine that trade losses would be large relative to the material and subjective costs of fighting. Warfare is already expensive, even among states with autarkic markets. Typically, states at war want to impose costs on an opponent.
A more plausible set of mechanisms can be had by looking at what markets do, and how they alter the interests of participating countries. Capital markets have become the crown jewels of the modern age. Vast wealth is in play each business day. As recent events attest, staggering losses can occur quickly when investors become frightened or skeptical. Any factor that influences the value of securities is salient to investors. Leaders who scare the capital markets pay a high price. Wealth is lost, investors are angered, and the government itself is often affected. The ability of governments in capitalist countries to service their debts depends on investor confidence. If investors and the state have slightly different incentives when it comes to political conflict, then leaders must choose between military aggression and mollifying investors. Rather than deterring conflict, which choice a leader makes informs observers about a leader's resolve and/or capabilities. Ceteris paribus, a leader that is willing to anger the markets to pursue a dispute is more resolved than one who shies away from financial losses. A leader that is unwilling to anger the markets is probably not resolved.
Markets also transform economies by allowing for more efficient allocation and accumulation of capital. As labor becomes relatively scarce and commodities grow cheap, the logic of employing expensive labor to take (versus make or trade) inexpensive inputs to production evaporates. Rich states are unwilling to deploy occupying armies to extract relatively cheap goods and services from other states, preferring instead to purchase these goods and services. If in addition it becomes widely understood that a group of prosperous countries no longer threaten one another directly or indirectly over access to inputs to production, then the security dilemma is no longer a menace.
In contrast, the transition from territorial to globalized commercial nations makes control of international agendas increasingly critical. Capitalist countries continue to contemplate war over policies and politics. However, markets also bring a level of consensus among capitalist states. Letting another country have its way in the realm of policymaking may or may not involve conflict (both nations may "want the same thing"). Adversaries can be allies when facing a common problem. If instead two governments have different agendas, then relations can become fractious. The importance of differences grows with the size of a nation's exposure to the international arena. Table 1 summarizes the admittedly complex processes discussed above. Three types of dyadic relationships are identified in the left column, developed, developing, and heterogeneous (one developed and one developing state). Each of the remaining columns in the table refers to a type of good over which conflict might occur. Property disputes are unlikely among developed states. Developing states mostly fight over property. In heterogeneous dyads, developed states (which can fight aggressive wars against weaker developing nations if they want to) have no desire to acquire more territory, while developing countries (which may covet land or other tangible property assets) are typically too weak or distant to prosecute conflicts against developed countries. Exceptions occur most often in contiguous heterogeneous dyads, and where developing countries are wealthy.
Agenda control can lead to conflict, but only when states disagree about preferred policies. Nations have no reason to fight to gain control of an agenda when victory yields similar policies to those imposed in defeat. Thus, the column for "Similar Interests" contains only PEACE. Fighting is possible when national interests differ, though bargains are still common, as warfare is costly and fighting typically ends in a bargain in any case. Developed states may be more likely to care about policy differences, but they are less likely to have such differences. Conflict resolution among developed countries may also be aided by better information as capital markets create transparency.
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR-HYPOTHESES
We examine the capitalist peace using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project. ICB data ignore "accidental" violence initiated by front line troops without the authorization of central authorities. Liberal peace theories emphasize choices facing heads-of-state, not those of sergeants, sailors, or pilots. The ICB data also code crisis escalation, a critical dimension along which to assess implications of liberal peace. For these Crisis Escalation ICB data code events in context, making it possible to study elements of the conflict process. Crises are organized in these data so as to allow for testing of hypotheses about escalation. ICB variables identify the initial impetus behind the crisis (TRIGGER), the reaction to the trigger (MAJRES), as well as the goals of the actors (ISSUE, GRAVITY), the crisis management techniques used by participants (CRISMG), and the intensity of any resulting violence (CENVIO, SEVVIO, VIOL).
One or two hypotheses cannot hope to address all existing or possible democratic peace theories. Still, there is consensus in the literature that democracies should be increasingly reluctant to fight each other as crises escalate (Kinsella and Russett 2002) . If conflict is proscribed by liberal norms, then the longer a crisis drags on, or the greater the potential for hostility, the more democracies should be inhibited by the norm. Similarly, liberal institutions are said to delay responses to conflict, allowing parties to negotiate and avoid further violence. A crisis that begins among democracies should presumably be resolved more often without escalating to deadly force, especially when force is not used at the outset. Transparency or signaling arguments also imply that democracies are less likely to escalate from initial crises, as audience costs resulting from a crisis increase leader credibility, more often allowing democracies to bargain and avoid additional conflict (Fearon 1994) .
H1: Once triggered, a crisis is less likely to escalate among democracies.
Interests and development are "prerequisite" factors in our theoretical model, affecting a state's willingness or ability to compete, but not determining whether states escalate, once a crisis has begun. Market transparency influences conflict in the second stage, facilitating negotiation through signaling after conflict is already at hand. Capitalist countries should be less likely to experience a crisis, even when they are willing and able to fight, but signaling should also impact bargaining even after crisis onset. Market-oriented countries are less likely to escalate after an initial trigger.
H2: Once triggered, a crisis is less likely to escalate among globally integrated economies.
Unlike market integration, development and interest affinity have little in the way of residual informational effects. While both processes discourage the initial onset of territorial crises, they should have no effect on escalation once a crisis begins. Development primarily affects whether states possess the basis for conflict, not how conflicts are resolved. Development should thus lead states to experience fewer contiguous crises, and endure more noncontiguous crises (the shift in emphasis from territory to policy), but will have no significant effect on whether crises escalate.
H3: Once triggered, a crisis among developed countries is no less likely to escalate.
As with development, similar policy objectives are likely to discourage the onset of a crisis, but policy affinity will not matter much for how crises are resolved, should they occur. States may disagree on many things to a slight degree, or on a few things intensely. If a crisis occurs in spite of states' general policy affinity, then the precursors of conflict exist. Again, there is nothing about interest similarity that affects the ability of states to negotiate effectively and to end crises quickly. 
Crisis Intensity and Specificity
Another set of hypotheses derive from crisis intensity. Democratic peace theories argue that escalation is increasingly less likely at higher levels of crisis intensity. This implies that democratic crises, when they occur, should typically be less violent than crises involving non-democracies.
H5: Crises among democracies should exhibit a lower level or intensity of violence.
Similarly, crises that escalate among integrated states should be less prone to high levels of violence. The signaling argument for integrated economies implies that these states are better able to contain crises that break out, leading to fewer big fights even within the sample of conflicts. Just as economic transparency reduces the need for a crisis, or for escalation, it also reduces the need for extensive fighting to generate sufficient revelation to resolve the contest (Slantchev 2003) .
H6: Crises in economically integrated dyads should experience a lower level of violence.
The nature and intensity of crisis behavior should also be affected by economic development. First, developed countries will tend to use more capital, and proportionately less labor, in their military force structures (Gartzke 2001) . Contests among developed states should be more expensive, but also less lethal. Here, we focus on the effect of development on the human costs of crises. Second, because development shifts conflict from resource competition to other issues, and because territorial conflict in particular is casualtyintensive (Vasquez 1993; Senese and Vasquez 2003) , the shift away from resource competition should reduce the intensity of contests and result in fewer casualties. This shift should be most apparent when censoring the sample of crises (looking precisely at territorial versus non-territorial crises). Thus, we add a hypothesis that identifies the shift from resource competition to crises over policy or other non-resource based differences between states.
H7: Crises in economically developed dyads should result in fewer
battlefield casualties.
H8: Crises in economically developed dyads should more often be associated with political-diplomatic or cultural issues and less often involve economic, territorial, or existence issues.
Finally, the intensity of contests that actually occur among states with similar interests should be roughly equivalent to violence levels for states with dissimilar policy interests. The similarity of national policy interests should affect whether states experience crises, but as a component of the "prerequisite" first stage, should not much influence behavior in crises. Unlike development, interests are also unlikely to shift the emphasis between competition over resources and policy.
H9: Crises in dyads with similar policy interests should exhibit about the same level or intensity of violence as crises among states with dissimilar policy interests.

RESEARCH DESIGN
We test our hypotheses on annual observations of dyad years from the post-World War II period . This is conventional practice in democratic peace research. Further, it reflects both data availability and the expectation that this period is most favorable to democratic peace theses.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in all of our analyses indicates whether a particular dyad experienced an international crisis in any given year. An individual state satisfies the conditions for crisis when its main foreign policy leaders perceive a heightened likelihood of military hostilities, a threat to basic national values, and a finite time within which to make decisions (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997:3) . A dyad experiences a crisis whenever at least one of the two states satisfies the ICB conditions and at least one state directs a hostile action against the other during the crisis (Hewitt 2003) . The concept of international crisis is substantially different from a militarized interstate dispute. By definition, ICB crises involve explicit challenges that elicit decisions from a state's highest ranking foreign policy leaders. MIDs, on the other hand, can result from clashes between frontline forces not directly authorized by leading officials. Prominent arguments about liberal peace focus on decisions by the leadership and have little to say about fishing incidents or accidental skirmishes.
The ICB dataset also has important advantages in testing additional implications of liberal peace theories not explored previously. ICB data allow a much closer approximation of the escalation processes of states. Important differences exist in how economic and political liberalism expects states to escalate conflict. The ICB sample also differs substantially from the MIDs, allowing for an independent test. As we point out above, the overlap in the two datasets is about 26%. 4 If testing comparable models in two different domains leads to similar results, we must begin to conclude that the relationships identified have considerable empirical validity. Differences, too, can be instructive.
Independent Variables
DEMOCRACY
We use standard Polity IV data to measure regime type (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) . We adopt the method recommended in the Polity codebook to minimize the number of missing values by recoding "missing value" of interregnum and transition (Marshall and Jaggers 2002:15-16 ). The variable DEMOCRACY (LOW) equals the value of the lowest democracy score in the dyad. We also include the variable for the higher democracy score in the dyad, DEMOCRACY (HIGH). Gartzke and Li 2003) . FIN.OPEN (LOW) is the lower of the two scores in a dyad. When no data are available, we follow the IMF practice of replacing missing values with a zero (missing data tend to be from poor or poorly integrated states). This practice has often been used in other studies of liberal peace (c.f. Gleditsch 2002) . 5 We also measure trade interdependence between dyad partners. TRADE DEP is the ratio of total national trade (imports plus exports) to GDP.
MARKETS FIN. OPEN (LOW) is an index of eight variables representing the degree of national economic openness reported by the International Monetary Fund
DEVELOPMENT
We use GDP per capita (in 1996 constant U.S. dollars) to measure economic development. Development is predicted to have contrasting effects on crisis onset. Increases in GDPPC (LOW) should make international crises more likely in general, while contiguous states that are developed should be less likely to experience an international crisis. Most disputes between contiguous states are territorial. These occur less often as the value of plundering resources declines. We use an interaction variable, GDPPC (LOW) × CONTIG, to measure this contingent effect.
INTEREST SIMILARITY
We use an index of annual voting records in the United Nations General Assembly to measure interest similarity between states. The approach has been applied elsewhere (Gartzke 1998 (Gartzke , 2000 Voeten 2000 Voeten , 2001 . The measure ranges from −1 (most dissimilar) to +1 (most similar). States with dissimilar interests are more likely to experience a international crisis.
Additional Variables
We incorporate a set of other variables common to studies of the liberal peace, including a dichotomous indicator of geographic contiguity, interval data on capital-to-capital distance, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a major power, a dichotomous variable for dyadic alliance status, and a variable for the capability ratio of dyad members. Coding of these 5 Imputing zeros for missing values could conceivably bias estimated relationships. Yet, since missing values are nonrandom (poor and poorly globalized states less often report data to the IMF), the missing values themselves introduce bias. We also estimated regressions in which missing values were not replaced with zeros. The financial openness variable remains significant at the 0.001 level, while other estimated coefficients were essentially unchanged. variables follows Oneal and Russett (1999) . Conflict behavior varies by geographic region (Henderson 2002; Bennett and Stam 2003; Lemke 2003) . The major oil exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa also appear developed according to per capita GDP statistics. However, they lack the diversified industrial economies capable of making states prefer commerce to territorial conflict. We include a dummy variable for observations involving two countries in the Middle East or North Africa. Table A1 in the appendix contains a replication of the basic analysis in Gartzke (2007) of conflict onset, this time using ICB crises rather than MIDs. The results are largely the same, and so we do not dwell on them here. However, before moving on to test the formal hypotheses, it may prove useful to provide a substantive interpretation of the replication findings. The software program CLARIFY (King et al. 2000) allows us to simulate the impact of the key independent variables on the likelihood of crisis involvement. 7 The baseline dyad consists of two unaligned, contiguous, minor powers that have mean values for all other non-dichotomous independent variables. We hold variables at their baseline levels and then simulate incremental changes in one variable of interest. Figure 2 presents four graphs of the estimated relative risk of crisis for different values of the key independent variables. We calculate the relative risk of crisis as the ratio of the predicted probability of crisis to the minimum predicted probability produced by the independent variable. In each of the graphs, we arrange values of the independent variables on the X axis such that the plot of the estimated relative risk of crisis increases from left to right. The vertical gray bars represent 95% confidence interval generated for each estimate at each level of the independent variable. Graph (A) shows that the relative risk of crisis barely increases at all as the value of Democracy (LOW) decreases from +10 to −10. Graph (B), on the other hand, shows that the relative risk of crisis increases substantially as the level of economic integration decreases in a dyad. At the same time, the graph reveals that the level of uncertainty is relatively higher around the 132 E. Gartzke and J. J. Hewitt predicted probabilities of crisis corresponding to low levels of economic integration. While the findings suggest that nonintegrated dyads are clearly more crisis prone, they also point to the higher variability in the probability of crisis for such states. The greater range in crisis propensities for integrated states suggests greater uncertainty about the likely outcomes of challenges with nonintegrated opponents (because, as theorized earlier, signaling is more difficult in such contests), leading to more errors in bargaining and subsequently to higher probabilities of escalation to war (Reed 2003a (Reed , 2003b . It should be noted that the apparent heteroskedasticity is not the same as is commonly associated with economic trend data. First, the independent variable in this case is an index, not a metric value. Second, the increase in variance is negatively correlated with values of FIN. OPEN (LOW).
RESULTS
Graph (C) presents the impact of interests on the probability of crisis. The figure shows that as interests change from the maximum of +1 (harmonious interests) to −1 (conflicting interests), the relative risk of crisis increases more than four-fold. Here again, what looks like heteroskedasticity is actually the result of theoretically-relevant uncertainty. States with similar interests almost never experience crises (Pr < 0.004). States with the most dissimilar interests possess a motive for conflict but whether they experience a crisis (or not) still depends on other determinants of bargaining success or failure. These additional determinants, including particularly 
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uncertainty about tangibles (the balance of power) and intangibles (resolve), are only salient if states already possess a grievance (which is also difficult to measure). Thus, as should be the case with a necessary condition, variance in outcomes and the probability of a crisis \emph{both decrease} in policy affinity.
Graph (D) depicts the impact of economic development (we omit the confidence intervals to reduce clutter). The relative risk of crisis for noncontiguous dyads is depicted with a series of triangles. Increases in GDPPC lead to a rapid increase in the likelihood of crisis involvement for noncontiguous states. In contrast, the series of solid circles depicts the impact of GDPPC for contiguous states. This plot reflects the simultaneous effect of two variables, GDPPC (LOW) and GDPPC (LOW) × CONTIG. The plot reveals that as GDP per capita increases for contiguous pairs of states, the predicted probability of crisis onset declines, leading to a reduction in the probability of a crisis across different levels of development. The components of development each have a substantial impact, but since each works in opposite directions, the net effect is modestly negative.
Evaluating Hypotheses about Crisis Escalation
We now turn to testing the hypotheses regarding crisis escalation. Escalation can refer to two types of heightening levels of hostility depending on whether the focus is on pre-crisis interactions or interactions during the crisis. First, at the precrisis stage, interstate interactions can increase in hostility and lead to the initiation of a crisis. That is, if the trigger that initiates a crisis involves the use of force, then the initiating event of the crisis already represents a significant escalation from the precrisis stage. This type of escalation is examined as part of crisis onset in the appendix.
Second, at the crisis stage, escalation can refer to an elevation in the level of hostility between combatants once the initial crisis trigger has occurred. The ICB data is a unique source of information about this type of escalation. However, in the case of triggers involving force, it is difficult to ascertain whether subsequent acts represent an escalation in the second sense of the term or not. When crisis interaction leads to full-scale war, the crisis has clearly escalated (due to the ICB definition of a crisis). In cases in which the crisis did not lead to war, determinations about escalation are more difficult. Noting these limitations, we measure escalation using the ICB coding for each country's major response to the crisis trigger. The dependent variable equals 1 when either dyad member uses military force in response to the trigger, else the escalation variable equals 0.
We test our hypotheses about escalation on dyadic crises during the period 1950-1992. We use moderate thresholds for statistical significance, given the much smaller sample size. In addition to key variables, we also include geographic contiguity, the logged distance between states, alliance and major power status, and the logged capability ratio in the dyad. We add two ICB variables that have proven to be consistent predictors of crisis escalation. First, a dummy variable codes whether the crisis trigger involved force. Wilkenfeld (1991) found that crises exhibit a strong violence-begetsviolence dynamic. The trigger intensity variable also addresses the selection problem posed by the discussion above. Second, we add a dummy variable for the perceived crisis threat level. Table 2 reports the results of five logit regressions of crisis escalation (sampling on crisis onset). We begin with a model equivalent to Model A1 in Table A1 that includes the two democracy variables and trade interdependence, but omits indicators for capital markets, development, or interstate interests (Model 1). As in the replication, we add variables sequentially, first introducing the measure of financial integration (Model 2), then GDP per capita (Model 3), the interaction term between wealth and contiguity (Model 4), and finally the affinity variable (Model 5).
In Model 1, we find that increases in Democracy (Low) and trade dependence have no discernible impact on the likelihood of crisis escalation, a result that persists in each of the subsequent models. Hypothesis 1 summarizing expectations of democratic peace theories is not supported. The estimate for Democracy (High) is positive and significant in Model 1 and remains so in subsequent models. Confrontations between states with dissimilar regime characteristics are more likely to escalate. Crises that begin with the use of force are more likely to feature the use of force as the major response. The estimate for the threat variable is insignificant; escalation does not follow from intimidation. Of the remaining variables, only the alliance dummy is significant, and positive.
Model 2 adds FIN. OPEN (LOW). The estimate is statistically significant (p = 0.024) and in the expected direction. The results support hypothesis 2. States that are integrated into global markets are better able to communicate credibly, reducing the need to escalate. Integrated markets facilitate signaling, identifying acceptable bargains that more often make it possible to settle crises short of war. Because learning has follow-on effects, FIN. OPEN (LOW) can be seen to influence crisis escalation even after states have failed to resolve their initial differences peacefully. The variable measuring initial military force in a crisis is also insignificant once we include an indicator of free markets. Military surprise may be less salient, or harder, for economically integrated states.
Regression models 3 and 4 add GDP per capita and the interaction with contiguity, respectively. Hypothesis 3 suggests that development has no effect on escalation, once a crisis occurs. As expected, neither development variable significantly determines the likelihood of escalation. While negative results of this kind cannot be considered definitive (the null is the critical hypothesis), corroboration with the other hypotheses suggests considerable empirical validity. Financial openness continues to discourage escalation. Alliances and Democracy (High) also remain escalation prone.
Model 5 adds the interest variable. As hypothesis 4 predicts, the variable is not statistically significant. While interests have a strong effect on crisis onset, escalation is driven by other factors, such as uncertainty. Adding interests does not alter the estimated effects of financial openness. Also, coefficients for distance and threat level are now significant in the expected direction. 
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E. Gartzke and J. J. Hewitt Evaluating Hypotheses about Crisis Intensity Hypotheses 5, 6, 7, and 9 offer predictions about how democracy, market integration, development, and interstate interests affect the number of fatalities, should a crisis occur. We again estimate five OLS regressions on the number of fatalities (in thousands) suffered by participants during a crisis. Since the dependent variable for the models in Table 3 is a count variable, the more appropriate estimation technique is negative binomial regression. We also estimated the models in Table 3 using negative binomial regression, but since the estimates are essentially the same, we report the OLS estimates to ease interpretation. We retain higher significance thresholds, given robust results. As Model 6 demonstrates, democracy reduces the intensity of crises, but not in the manner that democratic peace theory predicts. The estimated coefficient for DEMOCRACY (LOW) is insignificant, while DEMOCRACY (HIGH) is associated with declining fatalities. The finding is intriguing in light of the finding in Table 2 that DEMOCRACY (HIGH) increases escalation. TRADE DEP. (LOW) also appears to have a strong negative impact (i.e., it reduces fatalities).
With the exception of the variable for major power status, each of the control variables has a significant negative relationship with fatalities. Interestingly, crises between contiguous dyads involve significantly fewer fatalities than noncontiguous states. At the same time, increasing the distance between states also reduces crisis fatalities. Contiguity lowers the "fixed costs" of war. Transport, communications, and other barriers often make it impossible for distant countries to fight. The average level of fatalities in contiguous contests is lower, while the variance in fatalities in contiguous contests is higher. Conversely, distance selects on the middle range of contests. States that only care a little bit about an issue will find the fixed costs of distant warfare unacceptable, while the price of transporting and equipping large numbers of personnel far from home also discourages these contests. Variance in fatalities is reduced, but reduced more often at the low end of fatalities than at the high end. The fact that distant states are slightly more likely to escalate crises in Table 2 reflects the fact that threats of such contests are inherently less credible. Finally, crises between allies produce fewer fatalities, as do crises involving states with disparate capabilities.
Model 7 introduces the financial markets variable. As expected, globalized market economies experience significantly fewer fatalities. A unit increase in the market integration index leads to a decrease of over 40,000 expected battle deaths. At the same time, introducing financial openness leads DEMOCRACY (HIGH) and TRADE DEP. (LOW) to become statistically insignificant. The evidence in Model 7 supports hypothesis 6 but not hypothesis 5. Economically integrated states are better able to contain crises while democracy is largely irrelevant to the scale of bloodletting.
We add the impact of economic development in Model 8 and find that, unlike with crisis onset or escalation, the estimated coefficient for GDPPC is highly statistically significant (p = 0.000). This result is consistent with hypothesis 7. The size of the hypothesized relationship between development and casualties more than doubles when we add the interaction between GDPPC and contiguity in model 9. For the less developed state in a crisis dyad, a $100 increase in its GDP per capita reduces expected fatalities by approximately 5,200. While crises between economically developed, contiguous neighbors are infrequent, the results suggest that these crises are considerably more deadly. A $100 increase in GDP per capita in the less developed of two contiguous states increases total crisis fatalities by 5,100. Financial openness continues to reduce battlefield fatalities.
Finally, Model 10 adds the impact of interests. Hypothesis 9 anticipates that interest similarity affects incentives to initiate a crisis, but has little impact on the behavior of states once crises are underway. The findings from Model 10 support this line of reasoning. However, since many observations have missing values for the interest variable, our sample has shrunk considerably. The overall model performs poorly in this limited sample, which prevents us from asserting these conclusions with much confidence. While interests are an important determinant of whether crises occur, they are much less relevant to the intensity of crises that are already underway.
The evidence reported here regarding crisis onset, escalation, and intensity appears consistent with signaling by economically integrated crisis actors in ways that avoid, contain, and limit fatalities. Economic development is inversely related to crisis onset and to crisis fatalities, but only in noncontiguous dyads. In contiguous dyads, international crises become increasingly lethal with increases in development, reflecting the potential of developed neighbors to sow destruction. On the other hand, such crises become increasingly rare for developed states. Interests influence whether crises occur, but they do not affect casualties, nor do they matter for escalation. Democracy is not statistically significant in any regression where interests, markets, or development are represented.
CONCLUSION
The democratic peace is important, not just because it is a rare "lawlike" relationship in international relations, but also because of the hope it provides to many that the world can become a more peaceful place. It should not be surprising that the good news of democratic peace has been widely embraced by academic researchers, the policy community, and by interested observers. Nevertheless, the merit of an idea in an empirical science must rest in its observed impact more than its abstract virtue. This study contributes to a small but growing body of literature casting doubt on the robustness of the democratic peace observation. It has been known for some time that democracies are only peaceful in pairs. Other research has shown that the democratic peace is even more exclusive than previously imagined, limiting the finding to developed democracies (Hegre 2000; Mousseau 2000) . We take this insight full circle, demonstrating that it is economic development and market freedoms, rather than political liberty, that precipitate interstate peace.
It should be emphasized that the capitalist peace is an equally optimistic discovery. The fact that free markets and prosperity reduce the impetus to war means that the liberal peace still obtains, though with a considerably different causal logic and set of empirical precursors. Indeed, a liberal economic peace may be even more sustainable and transportable to the broader international community than is liberal government. Promoting democracy, even imposing it as some have advocated (or pursued), is not likely to reduce interstate conflict. While democracy is certainly desirable in its own right, democratizing for peace appears to be based on a misconception, and may even lead to a weakening of the actual determinants of liberal peace. If democracy leads to an expression of popular preferences in places where these preferences are incompatible with U.S. or other Western interests, then it should not be surprising to find that democratization can actually increase interstate conflict. The United States may be best advised to focus on promoting economic development and free markets. As we have shown, these are the more proximate causes of cooperation among states in the modern world, and may themselves help to promote democracy. experience crises with their neighbors over borders and territory, but more likely to confront distant countries over ideological or policy differences.
The value of distinguishing between these contrasting effects becomes clearer when we add the interaction term GDPPC (LOW) x CONTIG in Model A5. In Model A5, with the interaction term present, GDP per capita has significant, and opposite, effects. As anticipated, prosperity increases the likelihood of international crises, but decreases the probability of crises among contiguous states.
Finally, we offer an additional test that directly assesses the extent to which wealthy dyads engage in crises over policy differences rather than territorial contests. We use two ICB variables to identify crises over territory-GRAVTY (gravity of threats) and ISSUES (primary crisis issue). Taken together, the variables provide information about when the underlying threats and issues in a crisis touch upon territory and the allocation of resources. GRAVTY indicates when crises involve specific territorial threats, threats of grave danger to the population, and threats to existence. ISSUES identifies when crises occur over borders, access to the sea, and natural resources. These variables provide information to identify when underlying issues involve allocation of resources.
We estimate a bivariate logistic regression model using the dichotomous variable for territorial crises as the dependent variable and GDP/ Capita (Low) as the sole independent variable. 9 Scaling GDP/Capita (Low) into thousands of dollars to ease interpretation, the estimated coefficient is −0.1964 (z-statistic = −2.94, p = 0.003). For each $1,000 increase in GDP/ Capita (Low), the odds of a territorial crisis between states decreases by approximately 18%. To better appreciate the impact of average national income on the content of crises, consider two hypothetical dyads. In the first dyad, the less wealthy state has a GDP per capita equivalent to the World Bank cutoff between low income and low-middle income states ($2,262, 1985 dollars) . A crisis in this dyad is just about equally likely to involve territory or policy issues (1.015). In the second dyad, the less wealthy state is modestly better off, but not dramatically so, with a GDP per capita in the middle of the range for upper-middle income states ($6,661, in 1985 dollars) . Here, the estimated odds of a territorial crisis declines substantially to 0.428, so that a policy crisis is more than twice as likely. 
